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RIGHTS TALK AND PATIENT SUBJECTIVITY: THE
ROLE OF AUTONOMY, EQUALITY, AND
PARTICIPATION NORMS
Nan D. Hunter*

[I]llness is not merely a state of the organism and I or
1
personality, but comes to be an institutionalized role.
If the government was going to continue to act as if we
didn't exist, if the medical establishment was prone to gridlock
got
over funds, if the drug companies were waiting till the curve
2
high enough for profit, then we would find our own way.

INTRODUCTION

The great majority of individuals have related to the health care
system primarily as patients. For most of the history of medicine,
the patient has been the embodiment of a diagnosis, the passive
target of treatments, the recipient of i:qjections and infusions, and
the (hoped for) compliant consumer of medications and follower of
orders. No more. Patients themselves have changed the social
meaning of "patient" so dramatically that it only thinly resembles its
meaning of even a generation ago.
The patient's role today is often that of a partner in managing
care.
The patient can be a co-creator-sometimes more so,
sometimes less so, but almost always potentially-of the medical
regimen that she undertakes. And with this increasing autonomy
comes increasing accountability for prevention, wellness, and
maintenance, as well as various forms of liability-socially if not
(yet) legally-if those responsibilities are not fulfilled.
We also understand the patient today to be a consumer of
medical services, with a consumer's orientation to questions of price,
quality, and value. Yet "consumer" both fails to capture what is

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I thank my
colleague Patricia King and the participants at the Wake Forest Law School
Symposium on Patient-Centered Health Law and Ethics for their comments.
1. Talcott Parsons, The Sick Role and the Role of the Physician
Reconsidered, 53 MILBANK MEMORIAL FuND Q. 257, 261 (1975).
2. PAUL MONETTE, BORROWED TIME: AN AIDS MEMOIR 103 (1988).
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unique about the experience of health care and also implicitly cabins
individual agency and responsibility to market-related interactions.
In short, the role of the patient has become far more complex
than it ever has been before. The identity of patient has been deand reconstructed into ever thicker formulations. The conceptual
root of our contemporary understandings of "patient" is an
assumption of autonomous subjectivity, i.e., of an individual aware
of and capable of acting on her choices for medical care. The
Symposium of which this Essay is a part considers the most recent
stage in this evolution of meanings: the concept of patientcenteredness, with its implication of provider deference to the
patient's perspective.
Throughout this process of an evolving patient identity, law has
played a central constitutive role. In the 1960s and 1970s, the law
of informed consent brought the concept of patient autonomy into
the constellation of metanorms shaping the idealized doctor-patient
relationship. 3 From that process, the patient as a rights-bearing
subject emerged. In the 1970s and 1980s, women's health advocates
and AIDS patients brought a new level of militancy to the patient
role, undertaking representation on their own behalf and on behalf
of future patients with the same disease. Their efforts produced
lasting legal changes in such fundamental medical endeavors as
4
clinical research. In the last two decades, the rise of managed care
and the growing shift of financial burdens and risk onto the patient
were reflected in the model of patient as consumer, market actor,
and self-insurer-a change also inscribed by and into law. 5
Each of these developments carries a distinct political valence
with differing, even contradictory, implications for legal and political
frameworks for the health care system. Informed-consent doctrine
exemplifies liberal rights discourse, disease activism connotes
organized collective action, and the health-consumer identity has
facilitated market-oriented health policy. All have become part of
the experience of seeking health care, and all share one common
theme: they reflect a shift in the cultural meaning of "patient" from
a passive figure to that of an agentic actor with multiple dimensions
of subjectivity. They provide a starting point for understanding just
who the patient at the center is, what her roles will be in the health
care system as a whole, and what her reasonable expectations of
that system will encompass.
In this Essay, I take patient autonomy as the beginning point,
the source of much in modern bioethics and the antecedent of the
concept of patient-centeredness. My project is to enrich the values
at the core of patient identity, expanding them beyond autonomy
and beyond the treatment context and the doctor-patient dyad. I
3. See JESSICA W. BERGET AL., INFORMED CONSENT 21 (2d ed. 2001).
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part III.
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identify three additional dimensions of patient subjectivity that
must be accounted for if one is to develop a sound conceptualization
of patient-centeredness. In the process, I argue that the basis for a
new cultural norm ofbiocitizenship is emerging.
'
Part I retells the story of informed consent by surfacing the role
of equality norms. The law related to patient autonomy has
overlooked the role that the development of equality norms played
in the realization of concepts such as informed consent, as individual
and collective concerns about unequal treatment provided greater
support for the individual's right to decide. In this context, I mean
for equality to connote equal dignity, rather than the formal equality
of antidiscrimination doctrine. The law's oversight is largely a
product of the inadequacy of both antidiscrimination and informedconsent law to capture the full nature of the harm involved.
Current trends in informed-consent law are reinforcing the move
toward more equality in physician-patient status.
Part II examines the collective dimension of patient
participation in medical care. Disease-group activism has become
the most vibrant example of patient involvement in care, one that
was transformed when people with AIDS began articulating a vision
of patient empowerment that extended far beyond what were then
its assumed boundaries. This aggressive claim of a right to
participation as a group in research, resource allocation, and policy
decisions has been taken up by other advocates, most prominently
those involved with breast cancer issues. Although particular
factors associated with these two diseases suggest that widespread
migration of a norm of collective participation is unlikely, and there
are reasons as well to believe that it can be counterproductive in
certain ways, it nonetheless has become culturally available as a
model of doctor-patient relations.
In Part III, I analyze the ways in which the rhetoric of medical
consumerism interfaces with norms of autonomy, equality, and
participation. Although much in the language of "consumerdirected" health policy is driven by the desire to cut costs rather
than to enhance patient selfhood or the quality of care, the
promotion of an identity as consumer is a double-edged sword, both
altering and reinforcing traditional hierarchies of power in the
health care system.
Part IV places these strands in the context of biocitizenship
theory. The three qualities discussed in Parts I through IIIautonomy, equality, and participation-create a conceptual platform
on which it is possible to imagine building an understanding that
patients can, at least in some instances, assume the rights and
responsibilities that we associate with membership in a political
community.
To summarize, patient-centeredness could function as simply
the updated, more user-friendly iteration of the autonomy principle,
unless autonomy is not only supplanted but expanded in the ways

1528

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

that I describe. As we apply patient-centeredness to health law, our
aspiration should be to keep it both as multidimensional as each
patient actually is and as scalable as our massive health care
system demands.
Recognizing the broader context-with
acknowledgment of the importance of the values of equality and
participation-and seeing the possibility of further enhancing the
individual's role into that of citizen-like engagement will help us
achieve this goal.
I. ECHOES OF EQUALITY

I begin with a normative claim and a working definition. The
normative claim is that the core of any meaningful idea of patientcenteredness must be a prioritization of patient dignity. 6 My
working definition is that patient dignity embodies, at the least, two
principles: autonomy and equality-that is, that each patient is
presumed to be equally entitled to the respect due a moral agent,
and that in the realm of dignity and respect, doctor and patient are
peers. 7 The role of equality as central to autonomy may seem selfevident, but it is, at best, underdeveloped in the literature.
The law protecting patient autonomy is grounded most deeply
in informed consent. Doctrinally, informed consent is a species of
tort, and conceptually, it resonates with contractual notions of
"[s]elf-conscious, rational, functionally-specific agreements between
independent individuals." 8 The normative trump card is the "valuecomplex of individualism. "9
Equality is a much trickier concept; the formal equality
standard derived from antidiscrimination law once powerfully
applied to and altered health care institutions, 10 but that is much
less true today. 11
Moreover, the principle of equal dignity
6. The Institute of Medicine defines "patient centered" as "providing care
that is respectful of and responsive to individual patient preferences, needs, and
values and ensuring that patient values guide all clinical decisions." COMM. ON
QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM:
A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 40 (2001).
7. For purposes of this Essay, I wish to simply bracket the cultural
contingency of meanings of autonomy and to note that my focus is solely on
American culture and law.
8. Renee C. Fox, The Evolution of American Bioethics: A Sociological
Perspective, in SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES ON MEDICAL ETHICS 201, 206
(George Weisz ed., 1990).
9. Id.
10. See DAVID BARTON SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A
NATION 32-63, 96-142 (1999).
11. When the Supreme Court eliminated the possibility of private parties
bringing disparate impact challenges under Title VI in Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275 (2001), litigation against health care institutions on the ground of
race discrimination virtually stopped. See Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum,
Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modern Health Care System: Reinvigorating the
Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3
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encompasses something different from-both more and less thanthe command that likes should be treated alike. I wish to draw out
the relationship between the concepts of autonomy and equality in
health care and the central role that equality norms have played
and continue to play in the construction of patient autonomy and
informed consent.
The legal literature on informed consent and the literature on
rights-oriented social movements are seldom in conversation. 12 Yet
one could not understand patient rights, patient subjectivity, or
patient-centeredness without incorporating both autonomy and
13
equality rights. This Part of the Essay initiates that process.
I
begin by identifying how the cross-cutting nature of these concerns
shaped the origins of informed-consent law. I then discuss some of
the ways that equality concerns continue to influence that body of
law.
A.

Revisiting Informed Consent
The patient as rights-bearing subject entered both the law and
the medical community through the creation of the requirement of
informed consent. 14 Most histories of the law of informed consent
attribute its origins to a slow accretion of references in state tort law
that expanded a physician's duty not to touch patients without their
consent to include a duty to apprise patients of the risk of a
procedure. 15 This approach to autonomy draws on its deep moral
and philosophical roots. 16

YALE J. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS 215, 238-45 (2003).
12. See infra note 24 for some exceptions.
13. Two caveats: First, I am not making a simple causal argument, i.e.,
that certain social reform movements created informed-consent law (however, I
am arguing that those movements shaped how and when the doctrine emerged).
Second, this Essay does not attempt the kind of extensive historical analysis of
this relationship that, in my view, remains to be done. A full history would
consider the role of right-to-die campaigns, the disability rights movement,
groups organized to demand more control over access to unapproved drugs, and
efforts to secure translation services, among others.
14. See RUTH FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT 86-100 (1986).
15. See BERGET AL., supra note 3, at 4~6; FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra
note 14, at 119-40; cf. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to
Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 280-81 (1985)
(explaining that changing views of professional responsibility increased
expectations of doctors' affirmative disclosures of medical procedures). The
term "informed consent" was first used in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr.
University Board of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice:
Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REv. 257, 270 n.78 (2005).
16. See, e.g., Alfred I. Tauber, Historical and Philosophical Reflections on
Patient Autonomy, 9 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 299, 304-10 (2001); Bruce J.
Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV.
1705, 1707-15 (1992).
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In their definitive history of informed consent, Professors Ruth
Faden and Tom Beauchamp describe the key conceptual innovation
as the law's articulation of an affirmative duty by physicians to
provide the patient with the "facts which are necessary to form the
basis of an intelligent consent." 17
They mark this as the
inauguration of the independent importance of the autonomy
principle, apart from the instrumental value of patient consent as
an enhancement of old-fashioned patient qbedience. 18 Similarly,
Jaime King and Benjamin Moulton describe patient autonomy as
"the most well known principle of medical ethics." 19
Change in medical consent law was indeed evolutionary during
20
most ofthe twentieth century. The initial cultural groundwork for
informed consent was laid by public revulsion against experiments
conducted by Nazi physicians, and its legal codification derived from
the Nuremberg Code's prohibition against using human beings as
research subjects without their consent. 21 The pace of change vastly
accelerated in the early 1970s, however. 22 This occurred not only
because of the broader "rights revolution" in American society
during the same time, but also specifically because of the
politicization of medicine, along with other institutions. Indeed, it is
striking how neatly the instantiation of the informed-consent
requirement fits the model of a cycle-including a burst of rapid,
dramatic change preceded and followed by more dormant periodsthat often characterizes social-movement change. 23
The women's and racial justice movements were especially

17. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 14, at 125; see also Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal.
1972) (citing Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786).
18. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 14, at 125.
19. Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed
Consent: The Case for Shared Medical Decision·Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED.
429, 435 (2006).
20. See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 14, at 119-40.
21. See 2 NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 181
available
at
http://www .loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war
( 1949),
-criminals_Vol- II. pdf ("The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely
essential."); see also FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 14, at 153.
22. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAW
AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 3 (2003) ("Without
putting too fine a point on it, the critical period of change was 1966 to 1976.").
For other important cases in addition to Canterbury and Cobbs decided during
the 1970s, see Riedesser v. Nelson, 534 P.2d 1052 (Ariz. 1975); Holton v. Pfingst,
534 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1975); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014 (Md. 1977); Llera v.
Wisner 557 P.2d 805 (Mont. 1976); Gerety v. Demers, 589 P.2d 180 (N.M. 1978);
Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979); Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1971); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972); and Scaria
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 227 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1975).
23. See John D'Emilio, Cycles of Change, Questions of Strategy: The Gay
and Lesbian Movement After Fifty Years, in THE POLITICS OF GAY RIGHTS 31, 4142 (Craig A. Rimmerman et al. eds., 2000).
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significant in the move toward recognition of patient-autonomy
24
rights. Physician disrespect of patients had long been exacerbated
by race and gender, and equality movements of the mid-twentieth
century included these issues as part of their a§"endas. 25 This
equality-focused "master frame" of social change, 2 and the new
social meanings that resulted from it, shaped the contours, timing,
and social meaning of the informed-consent doctrine.
An example is the role of women's health issues in the
construction of informed consent. Recent historical research tells us
that a case that is often cited as a classic of autonomy principles
because of Justice Cardozo's epigrammatic dictum-"Every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body'' 27 -could be more properly
understood as early evidence for the women's health movement.
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital arose from the
unauthorized performance of a hysterectomy after the physician
determined that the patient was "too nervous" for a vaginal
examination. 28 Observing the etiquette of a hundred years ago,
Justice Cardozo did not mention these details in his opinion. Mary
Schloendorff consented to an "ether exam" but not to surgery. 29 The
outcome did not vindicate informed consent, however; the New York
Court of Appeals affirmed judgment for the hospital on the ground
of charitable immunity. 30
Framed as a women's rights case, Schloendorff marks a
protofeminist departure point for the resistance of women patients
to a broad range of misogynist practices in later decades. Historian
David Rothman notes that the women's movement of the 1970s
24. Dr. Barron Lerner has specifically noted the impact of the women's
health movement on the development of informed-consent law. See Barron H.
Lerner, Inventing a Curable Disease: Historical Perspectives on Breast Cancer,
in BREAST CANCER: SOCIETY SHAPES AN EPIDEMIC 25, 42 (Anne S. Kasper &
Susan J. Ferguson eds., 2000); cf Patricia A. King, Race, Equity, Health Policy
and the African American Community, in AFRICAN AMERICAN BIOETHICS 67, 69
(Lawrence J. Prograis Jr. & Edmund D. Pellegrino eds., 2007) (discussing the
history of disparity in African-American health care). See generally Patricia A.
King, Reflections on Race and Bioethics in the United States, 14 HEALTH MATRIX
149 (2004).
25. See ROTHMAN, supra note 22, at 142-44 (describing how feminist
movements in the 1960s increased female patient autonomy); SMITH, supra note
10, at 40-44, 50-57, 76-79, 91-95.
26. See David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Master Frames and Cycles of
Protest, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 133, 138-44 (Aldon D.
Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992) (explaining "master frames" and
their relevance to social movements).
27. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914),
superseded by statute, N.Y. PuBLIC HEALTH LAw§ 2805-d (McKinney 2007).
28. Paul A. Lombardo, Phantom Tumors and Hysterical Women: Revising
Our View of the SchloendorffCase, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 791, 795 (2005).
29. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93.
30. ld. at 95.
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found that "the issue of men dominating women was inseparable
31
from doctors dominating patients." The catalog of deprivations of
patient autonomy that motivated feminists included Cesarean
sections for physician convenience and sterilization and mastectomy
32
without specific consent.
Informed consent both was and was not a "women's issue."
There are many post-Schloendorff cases that resonate with heavily
33
gendered forms of paternalism and legal arguments.
Needless to
say, what was then the professional norm for beneficence, including
34
the failure to tell patients of terminal diagnoses or the taking of
35
liberties during surgery, extended to male patients as well. Yet
many of the common practices used with women patients reinforced
a broader set of subordinating practices and thereby triggered an
explicitly feminist political response.
Despite this connection, there was no sex discrimination legal
claim, as such, available. Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
covering entities such as hospitals that receive federal funds, does
36
not prohibit discrimination based on sex. No portion of the Civil
Rights Act prohibits discrimination in the provision of services by
private health care providers. And a claim against a public entity
grounded in the Equal Protection Clause requires a showing of
37
intentional discrimination, which can be difficult to prove.
Somewhat independently, abortion was also an important issue
for both the women's movement and bioethics, and it illustrates the
speed of change in the doctor-patient relationship during the same
period. Justice Blackmun insisted that his opinion for the Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade did not allow "abortion on demand" because of
38
the central role accorded to the physician in decision making.
However, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, medical authorities
31. RoTHMAN, supra note 22, at 142-43.
32. See Lerner, supra note 24, at 40-42; Marc A Rodwin, Patient
Accountability and Quality of Care: Lessons from Medical Consumerism and the
Patients' Rights, Women's Health and Disability Rights Movements, 20 AM. J.L.
& MED. 147, 157-63 (1994); see also Lombardo, supra note 28, at 796-97
(describing the Schloendorff physician performing a hysterectomy without the
patient's consent).
33. See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 187, 193 (W.D. La. 1955);
Carman v. Dippold, 379 N.E.2d 1365, 1370 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Charley v.
Cameron, 528 P.2d 1205, 1210 (Kan. 1974); Henry v. Bronx Lebanon Med. Ctr.,
385 N.Y.S.2d 772, 775 (App. Div. 1976); Sinclair v. Block, 633 A.2d 1137, 114041 (Pa. 1993); see also Suzanne K. Ketler, Note, The Rebirth of Informed
Consent: A Cultural Analysis of Informed Consent After Schreiber v. Physicians
Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.1029, 1039-45 (2001).
34. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 17-25 (1984).
35. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
37. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42 (1976).
38. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973); Nan D. Hunter, Justice
Blackmun, Abortion, and the Myth of Medical Independence, 72 BROOK. L. REV.
147, 184-85 (2006).
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shifted from seeking liberalization of abortion laws to supporting
repeal of any abortion-specific restrictions. 39 As a result, the effect
of delegating authority to the treating physician amounted to giving
the full right to decide to the woman patient. Later, the Court
recognized protection for autonomy in reproductive choice to be a
necessary component of women's equality as citizens and references
to the physician's role as joint decision maker effectively ended. 40
Alongside change in the law regarding informed consent in
medical care, the question of informed consent for human research
subjects was revolutionized when press reports brought public
attention to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. 41 For the previous forty
years, many of the almost four hundred African-American men who
were subjects in a Public Health Service study of the effects of
syphilis had been denied treatment for the disease, including
penicillin, which became available roughly midway through the
study. 42 Although the necessity of informed-consent principles for
research had already become part of the Nuremberg Code 43 and the
Helsinki Declaration, 44 Tuskegee-with its implication of profoundly
racist medical decision making-led to a literal rewriting of the law.
Congressional hearings followed the disclosure in the press, 45 as did
46
the National Research Act,
which created the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, 47 which published the Belmont Report, 46 which
led to the federal regulation now known as the "Common Rule. "49
39. See Hunter, supra note 38, at 192-96; see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179, 197-98 (1973) (striking down a law that allowed abortion only if a
committee of physicians approved the procedure).
40. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
41. See, e.g., Jean Heller, Syphilis Victims in U.S. Study Went Untreated for
40 Years, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1972, at Al.
42. See JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TuSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT
147, 150, 160--64 (1981); SUSAN M. REVERBY, EXAMINING TuSKEGEE: THE
INFAMOUS SYPHILIS STUDY AND ITS LEGACY 63-64, 89-90 (2009).
43. NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, supra note 21, at 181-82; see also
REVERBY, supra note 42, at 189.
44. WORLD MED. Ass'N, WORLD MEDICAL AsSOCIATION DECLARATION OF
HELSINKI: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN
SUBJECTS 2-4 (2008), available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications
/10policies/b3/17c.pdf; see also REVERBY, supra note 42, at 189.
45. See Quality of Health Care-Human Experimentation, 1973: Hearing on
S. 974, S. 878, and S.J. Res. 71 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm.
on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong. 3-4 (1973); see also REVERBY, supra
note 42, at 100--03.
46. National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974).
47. Id. § 201, 88 Stat. at 348.
48. Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,192-93, 23,195 (Apr. 18,
1979).
49. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.124 (2009); Fazal Khan, The Human Factor:
Globalizing Ethical Standards in Drug Trials Through Market Exclusion, 57
DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 887 (2008) ("Pursuant to the National Research Act, [the
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The Tuskegee Study survivors themselves received
compensation from the settlement of a class action lawsuit filed on
their behalf by lawyers 'working with the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund. 50 Ironically, however, this case did not contribute to the
development of informed-consent doctrine. In part because of the
participation of the historically black Tuskegee Institute and local
African-American physicians in the study, the plaintiffs' lawyers
faced a difficult proof problem in basing the case on a violation of the
51
Equal Protection Clause. The other major claim-a claim that the
study failed to obtain informed consent from the participants-was
complicated by a potential sovereign-immunity defense, which
plaintiffs sought to avoid by proceeding under the Federal Tort
Claims Act ("FTCA"), 52 a strategy that made relief contingent on
whether Alabama state law recognized a cause of action for
abrogation of informed consent. 53
The court never reached the merits of the claims, and the
settlement was probably a relief to plaintiffs' lawyers. 54 The legal
obstacles they encountered illustrate the misfit in law between the
principles of equal dignity and the structure of antidiscrimination
law. In what today would be recognized as an example of the kind of
doctrinal lacunae identified in intersectionality theory, 55 the law
simply lacked the conceptual capacity to capture the full nature of
the harm done to the men in the study.
The Tuskegee example implicates two forms of compound
discrimination:
'[M]ultiple discrimination' can occur in at least two ways:
where the grounds of discrimination are additive in nature,
and/or where the discrimination is based on an indivisible
combination of two or more social characteristics. The former,
government] instituted regulations governing human research that became
known as the "Common Rule.").
50. See Pollard v. United States, 69 F.R.D. 646, 647-49 (M.D. Ala. 1976);
Larry I. Palmer, Paying for Suffering: The Problem of Human Experimentation,
56 Mo. 1. REV. 604, 608-10 (1997).
51. See FRED D. GRAY, THE TuSKEGEE SYPmLIS STUDY 84-90 (1998).
Professor Palmer argues that Attorney Fred Gray's decision to build the case
around a theory of racial selection was "unwise" because it ignored the
complexities of who was involved. See Palmer, supra note 50, at 610.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006).
53. Under the FTCA, an individual can obtain damages from the
government upon showing governmental action resulting in what amounts to a
personal injury in the law of the state where the injury occurred. Id.
§ 1346(b)(1).
54. Fred Gray, plaintiffs' lead counsel, had hoped to avoid litigation
altogether by obtaining financial relief for his clients after the congressional
hearings, but those efforts failed. See REVERBY, supra note 42, at 101-03.
55. See Sarah Hannett, Equality at the Intersections: The Legislative and
Judicial Failure To Tackle Multiple Discrimination, 23 O.J.L.S. 65, 68 (2003)
(Eng).
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'additive discrimination', describes a situation where an
individual 'belongs to two different groups, both of which are
affected by [discriminatory] practices.' The latter, commonly
referred to as 'intersectional discrimination,' 'arises out of the
combination of various oppressions which, together, produce
something unique and distinct from any one form of
discrimination standing alone.' 56
The men in the Tuskegee Study were certainly victims of the former
and perhaps also of the latter.
Research practices in the 1940s, when the study began, were
such that particular forms of oppression were directed toward black
research subjects, thus arguably constituting that as a specific
identity. The Tuskegee Study was extreme but not aberrational.
Professor Smith quotes a New York surgeon in 1926 as saying,
"[T]he Negro has always been appropriated as choice 'clinical
material' by the medical profession. In the eyes of racists in that
profession, the Negro was always next in line beyond the
experimental animal." 57 The men in the Tuskegee Study were
victimized both because of their race and their status as research
subjects, but neither ground alone provided a strong legal basis for
recovery. Neither antidiscrimination nor tort law was adequate to
address the extent to which dual subordinating discourses had
deepened the harm to plaintiffs.
In neither of these examples-the Tuskegee Study nor the
women's health movement-can one assume that abstract principles
of informed consent or equality, without more, would have offered
adequate remedies.
One might question, for example, how
genuinely autonomous any decisions made by low-income MricanAmericans in Alabama in the 1940s could have been. Even the
strongest informed-consent protocols were not likely to have had
much impact in that context.
Yet the dominant lesson that emerges from efforts to eliminate
subordinating practices based on race and sex remains that of the
mutually reinforcing and constitutive nature of the relationship
between equality and autonomy norms. Over time, arguments for
one value have strengthened claims for the other.

B.

The Micropolitics of Medicine
Doctors' offices and hospitals are highly politicized sites of
interaction, in which both the intrastaff work culture and the
provider-patient treatment culture produce and enforce a broad
range of norms. Clinical medicine is a venue rife with power
relations. In this context, where information parity between doctor
and patient exists only rarely, the concept of informed consent has

56. I d. at 65, 68 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
57. SMITH, supra note 10, at 24.
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allowed development of a medical practice norm in which treatment
is a team effort joined by physicians, staff, and patient working as
partners, each with differing roles.
In effect, informed-consent doctrine has created a legal platform
upon which a partial equalization between doctor and patient can be
built into the culture of medical practice. Depending on their level
of psychological and physical strength, many patients continue to
seek doctors to whom they can entrust decision-making authority.
But most patients no longer approach physicians with the "abject
dependence" 58 formerly characterized as typical.
This is not to claim that the informed-consent process is a
smoothly functioning means of patient empowerment, or that the
answer is a simple response of "the more informed consent, the
better." Empirical studies have found that both doctor and patient
are often unsatisfied with current informed-consent standards,
sometimes for conflicting reasons. 59
Both frequently resist
wholehearted reliance on patient decision-making, 60 while at the
same time patients are also dissatisfied with insufficient levels of
participation in decision making. 61 Physicians routinely truncate
the process, now referred to as "consenting the patient." Looking
toward the future, the economics of medical practice seem
increasingly likely to impede the expansion of the informed-consent
process as an ingredient in doctor-patient interaction. 62 Its utility as
a remedy is questionable because of the difficulty of proving
causation and damages. 63
Yet, despite the gap between informed-consent law as it exists
on the books and as it occurs in medical practice on the ground, the
ideal of patient autonomy retains its power to shape norms and
social understandings. 64 Informed consent has become engrained in
58. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9-10 (Cal. 1972).
59. See Peter Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899,
932-35 (1994) (discussing various studies).
60. See CARL SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 40--46 (1998); Cathy
J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Decisionmaking: Toward
a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379, 397-427 (1990);
King & Moulton, supra note 19, at 446-48, 461-62. See generally Clarence H.
Braddock et al., Decision Making in Outpatient Practice: Time To Get Back to
Basics, 282 JAMA 2313 (1999); Jay Katz, Informed Consent-Must It Remain a
Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 69 (1993).
61. See King & Moulton, supra note 19, at 468-73.
62. Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of
Health Care Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 292-305 (1999). To some
extent, this problem may be alleviated through the use of videos and other
"decision aids." See King & Moulton, supra note 19, at 488-90.
63. See generally Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision
Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L.
REv. 607 (proposing a shift from focusing on proximate cause to identifYing and
valuing the patient's decision rights, which, the authors argue, doctors destroy
by withholding information).
64. Faden and Beauchamp describe the mixed impact of informed consent
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rights talk for patients generally and in various versions of a
"patient bill of rights." 65 Moreover, patients are pushing the
boundaries of informed consent, albeit with limited success.
Patients are using informed-consent arguments to seek information
about the physician as well as about the nature of the proposed
treatment. The new topics to which courts have, to varying degrees,
applied informed-consent principles are provider experience,
provider health status, and financial incentives.
Two state supreme courts have ruled that an informed-consent
claim may lie depending on the circumstances and degree of
falsification if a physician misrepresents her experience or
credentials. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that a physician
was liable under an informed-consent theory for misleading the
patient about how many times he had performed the surgery in
question, which was a difficult neurological procedure, and for
failing to disclose the comparative risks between having the surgery
66
and not having it.
The New Jersey Supreme Court followed
Wisconsin in holding:
[l]f an objectively reasonable person could find that physician
experience was material in determining the medical risk of
the ... procedure to which plaintiff consented, and if a
reasonably prudent person in plaintiffs position informed of
the defendant's misrepresentations about his experience would
not have consented, then a claim based on lack of informed
.
. d .67
consent may b e ma1nta1ne
However, as the New Jersey court pointed out, generally courts have
held that physicians do not have an affirmative duty to disclose
information regarding their experience or training. 66
Courts have also diverged in how they have handled claims that
a patient had a right to be notified of other physician characteristics,
such as a history of substance abuse or a diagnosis of a
communicable disease such as AIDS or HIV. Several courts have
expressed fear of a slippery slope of possible required disclosures
that extend too far to be justified by public policy, or have deferred
on medical practice as follows: "At the same time that nothing has changed in
medicine, everything has changed." FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 14, at
100.
65. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hafemeister & Richard M. Gulbrandsen, Jr., The
Fiduciary Obligation of Physicians To "Just Say No" if an "Informed" Patient
Demands Services that Are Not Medically Indicated, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 335,
361 & n.145, 362 (2009).
66. Adler ex rel. Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 510 (Wis. 1996); see
also Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed
Consent: Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 3-8 (1999)
(discussing Johnson, 545 N.W.2d 495).
67. Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 84 (N.J.
2002).
68. Id. at 82-83.
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to professional organizations to impose discipline in situations of
69
physician substance abuse.
Other courts, however, have found a
70
cause of action.
Acceptance of the individual's right to know how her health
plan structures financial incentives that might influence a
provider's recommendations related to treatment has produced
federal 71 and state 72 disclosure requirements.
These new directions in informed-consent law are not about who
will make the final decision regarding a course of treatment or even
about bargaining power between doctor and patient. If patients are
sufficiently annoyed by a paternalistic or uncommunicative doctor,
most can switch physicians, at least for outpatient care. Although
the doctrinal function of informed consent is to guarantee that a
patient is told of all material risks associated with a course of
treatment so that she can intelligently decide whether to proceed,
the actual function of the doctrine on the ground may do more to
shape patient expectations about communication than about
decision making per se.
One major rationale for informed consent is to diminish the
information asymmetry between professional and layperson. 73 It is
also true, however, that information disclosure about the
physician-and not merely about the statistical risk associated with
a given procedure-functions as a partial equalizer of doctor and
patient. Traditionally, the patient's role has been to furnish a
detailed medical history while often knowing no more about a
physician than her practice areas and what can be gleaned from
diplomas on the wall. Asserting a claim to know more signifies an
unwillingness to accept the traditional hierarchy, as well as a desire
for self-determination.
C.

Summary
The ostensible purpose of the informed-consent requirement is

69. See, e.g., Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777, 787
(Ga. 2000) (alleged cocaine use); K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 559-60
(Minn. 1995) (HIV/AIDS); Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213, 216-17 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1991) (alleged alcohol abuse).
70. See, e.g., Ridding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192, 1198 (La. Ct. App. 1991)
(alleged alcohol abuse); Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 339 (Md. 1993)
(HIV/AIDS).
71. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 197 4, Pub. L.
No. 93-406, §§ 404, 502, 88 Stat. 829, 877, 891 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1132 (2006)). The disclosure duty is on the health-plan
provider, not the medical provider. See Tracy E. Miller & William M. Sage,
Disclosing Physician Financial Incentives, 281 JAMA 1424, 1427 (1999).
72. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1076(i)(6) (2010); R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 23-17.13-2(b)(8)-(10) (2008); see also Krause, supra note 62, at 375-85
(discussing state statutes' disclosure requirements); Miller & Sage, supra note
71, at 1427, 1430 & n.33.
73. See Schuck, supra note 59, at 957-58.
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to provide the patient with a form of the right to exit, i.e., a right to
determine whether to proceed with treatment that the doctor
recommends. I suggest that one reason its vitality as an ideal
continues, however, is that, although its utility in securing the right
to exit may be more aspirational than real, because patients often
rely on physicians for the expertise that determines their decisions,
it does enable at least some patients to rebalance the doctor-patient
power dynamic in communication. In other words, its primary
function is less about exit than about voice, and specifically about a
more dialogic, mutually respectful voice. This inflection in the social
meaning of informed consent grew from the impact on its
development of the women's health movement and the civil-rights
movement.
It is not difficult to understand why the equality dimension of
informed consent has been understated in legal scholarship. The
primacy of individualism in health law is overdetermined by the
prevailing values in American culture, the individualist norms of
bioethics, and the structure of medical practice. In addition, the
concept of equality is difficult to define in health care; the standard
antidiscrimination approach offers little assistance. And, at least in
terms of the doctor-patient dyad, equality in every respect is not
even desirable: patients want there to be some information
asymmetry between themselves and their care providers.
Yet the invisibility of equality norms in this context is
unfortunate. An increasing number of patients-either individually
or, as I will address in the next Part, collectively-approach health
care with at least the hope of a collaborative relationship with their
provider. As the financial consequences of both treatment and
health status increasingly shift to patients, the trend toward more
active patient involvement in such care is only likely to gather
steam. In this situation, the technical concept of consent as the
assumption of known risk is a desiccated understanding of equal
dignity and, therefore, of patient-centeredness.

II. PATIENT ACTIVISM
One of the most profound changes in the role of patients has
been the emergence of group-identity movements based on specific
diseases. Disease-based advocacy groups have operated in the
United States since early in the twentieth century, initially with the
goals of informing the public and the medical profession about the
particular disease and seeking additional funding for research. 74
74. Even early public education campaigns could be militant, however. In
1936, the American Cancer Society launched a volunteer effort known as the
Women's Field Army, complete with khaki uniforms and the insignia of rank.
Women's Field Army members solicited funds and sponsored events that
greatly increased popular knowledge of cancer. See JAMES T. PATTERSON, THE
DREAD DISEASE 71-73, 121-24 (1987).
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But the response to HIV/AIDS redrew the boundaries of possibility
for health care related activism. The social-movement model that
AIDS activists created became the new template for disease-based
advocacy, such that within a decade after the HIV/AIDS epidemic
began, a rising generation of breast cancer advocates selfconsciously adopted and adapted it. In this Part, I analyze these
two movements and the role of law in shaping how activism
influences individual patient subjectivity.
AIDS activism and breast cancer activism share three
important characteristics that are not accounted for in either the
autonomy or the civil-rights literature.
First, the identity
implicated in each movement is two-dimensional, in that it is both
specific to a disease and heavily associated with another stigmatized
characteristic. Thus, both were able to build on the organizational
and other resources already developed by a closely related identitypolitics movement. Second, legislation enacting formal equality
protections for the group was not the primary focus of either group's
campaign, although both sought change that was heavily predicated
on equality norms. Thus their agendas differed from those of
traditional civil-rights organizations.
Third, both movements
instead prioritized the appropriation of additional funds to combat
the disease with which they were concerned, and the adoption of
mechanisms guaranteeing participation by group representatives in
decision making concerning research and other scientific questions.
Most important, both movements altered the protocols for the
governance of scientific and medical institutions, a major step
beyond the traditional role of patients.

A.

HIV IAIDS Activism
Militant engagement by AIDS patients began in 1983, when a
conference of PWAs (persons with AIDS-the very term "patient"
sounded too dependent) met in Denver. 75 One of their first acts was
to adopt the Denver Principles ("Principles"), which both reaffirmed
76
patient autonomy and powerfully raised the ante. The Principles
recognized the rights of PWAs to receive "full explanations of all
medical procedures and risks, to choose or refuse their treatment
modalities, to refuse to participate in research without jeopardizing
their treatment and to make informed decisions about their lives.""
By the late 1980s, the center of AIDS activism was the New
York City organization ACT-UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash

75. William B. Rubenstein, Law and Empowerment: The Idea of Order in
the Time of AIDS, 98 YALE L.J. 975, 990-91 (1989); Michael Callan & Dan
Turner, A History of the People With AIDS Self-Empowerment Movement, THE
BODY (Dec. 1997), http://www.thebody.com/contentlart31074.html.
76. See Rubenstein, supra note 75, at 990.
77. ld. at 991; see also Callan & Turner, supra note 75.
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Power). 78 ACT-UP, composed primarily of gay men, who then
constituted the overwhelming majority of AIDS patients, 79 led an
extraordinarily successful strategy that changed the terms of
clinical trial enrollment, research design, and pharmaceutical
approval processes. ACT-UP's modus operandi was a combination of
"street theater and intimidation on the one hand, [and] detailed
position papers and painstaking negotiation on the other." 80
Although part of the response to AIDS stigma included efforts to
enact antidiscrimination and privacy laws, those issues were never
the primary focuses for ACT-UP. Instead, driven by the urgency of
a fatal disease with no cure and initially no treatment, activists left
civil-rights issues to established public-interest law organizations
and concentrated their demands on securing access to possible
medications and on obtaining larger appropriations for research,
81
treatment, and prevention.
They succeeded repeatedly. In 1987, ACT-UP protested limited
enrollment in clinical trials for AZT (zidovudine) and the lengthy
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") process for allowing drugs
onto the market. 82 As a direct result, unapproved drugs were made
available under a "compassionate use" program, and the FDA
revamped its formal approval process. 83 Similar protests led to
community-based clinical trials and the growth of "buyers' clubs"
that purchased pharmaceuticals from outside the United States. 84
Other accomplishments included enactment of the nation's first
disease-specific funding law, the Ryan White CARE Act. 85
Sociologist Steven Epstein argues that the legacy of AIDS
activism is a new kind of patient identity in at least two respects.
First, he asserts that "it has rapidly become something of a cliche to
say that the doctor-patient relationship will never be the same in
the wake of AIDS." 86 Acknowledging that alterations in the
paternalism-dependency dynamic had already begun, Epstein
contends that "the significant effect of AIDS ... is that a more
cooperative model has become normative (at least in medical

78. See Rubenstein, supra note 75, at 993-94.
79. See PATRICIA D. SIPLON, AIDS AND THE POLICY STRUGGLE IN THE UNITED
STATES 4--5 (2002).
80. Robert M. Wachter, AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Health, 326
NEW ENG. J. MEn. 128, 128 (1992).
81. Id.
82. STEVEN EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM, AND THE POLITICS OF
KNOWLEDGE 213-14, 222-26 (1996).
83. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Public's Right to Health: When
Patient Rights Threaten the Commons, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1335, 1355-56
(2009); Kent A. Sepkowitz, AIDS-The First 20 Years, 344 NEW ENG. J. MEn.
1764, 1770 (2001).
84. See SIPLON, supra note 79, at 26--32.
85. See id. at 93-102.
86. EPSTEIN, supra note 82, at 346.
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rhetoric)." 87 However, it hardly needs stating that it is difficult to
imagine that the conduct of these physicians, or the application of
this norm, was the same for low-income or minority HIV/AIDS
patients as it was for the primarily middle-class white men who
dominated ACT-UP. It is more likely that the doctor-patient
relationship will never be the same for some patients, but will
change much less for others.
In perhaps a more justifiable claim, Epstein argues that AIDS
advocacy produced a new conception of scientific knowledge. 88 Some
ACT-UP members developed an extraordinarily sophisticated grasp
of technical knowledge, enabling them to hold their own in debates
with scientists over such rarefied subjects as identification of
89
surrogate markers of the disease. Even more challenging to the
scientific establishment, ACT-UP also contended that patients
brought new and different kinds of knowledge that should be
considered necessary for excellence in medical research. 90 AIDS
catalyzed what became the first movement to self-consciously
transform patients into "activist-experts." 91

B.

Breast Cancer Activism
The women who took up breast cancer patient advocacy in the
1980s and 1990s continued feminist health political work from the
1970s and added to it the tactics of AIDS activism. 92
Like the 1970s women's groups, the breast cancer movement
rejected medical paternalism in treatment norms. Echoing ACT-UP,
organizers also sought to refashion research. The movement
directed its primary demands toward the goals of access to new
drugs, changing inclusion criteria for clinical trials, and setting new
directions for funding and priorities in medical research. 93
Unlike those in the movement related to HIV/AIDS, advocates
for breast cancer patients were dealing with a disease that was
neither new nor communicable. As a result, research efforts were
more standardized and not susceptible to the lurching, frenzied
changes that occurred as scientists desperately pursued more
information about AIDS and the causative virus. Moreover, the
stigma associated with breast cancer was far less intense than the
stigma associated with AIDS, if only because the disease was much
less threatening to those who did not have it. Thus in many ways,
the breast cancer campaign provided a test, under more normal
87. ld.
88. ld. at 8-9, 229.
89. ld. at 8-9.
90. Id.
91. ld. at 8.
92. CAROL S. WEISMAN, WOMEN'S HEALTH CARE: ACTMST TRADITIONS AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 207 (1998).
93. See REBECCA DRESSER, WHEN SCIENCE OFFERS SALVATION 165-67 (2001).
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circumstances, of the validity of the HIV/AIDS model for a social
movement related to health care.
Much of the "law" generated by breast-cancer patient advocacy,
like much of what ACT-UP generated, consisted of appropriations
and funding legislation. 94 However, the cancer-patient advocates
took the AIDS strategy one step further and more firmly
institutionalized its successes in achieving a place for patients
inside the major research institutions. The breakthrough came in
two budget allocations in the mid-1990s. 95 Congress appropriated
ten million dollars to implement the Clinton administration's
National Action Plan on Breast Cancer in legislation that included a
provision that allowed patient advocates to participate in the review
committees for research grant making. 96 Soon after, advocates
obtained an equivalent provision in legislation that established
breast cancer research in the Department of Defense ("DoD"), a
location that insulated it from cuts in domestic funding that
customarily exempted DoD. 97 The National Breast Cancer Coalition
then established its own training programs to prepare lay advocates
to be able to engage effectively with the physicians and scientists
with whom they would interact in the grant application review
process. 98

C.

Limiting Factors
The kind of mobilization that HIV/AIDS and breast cancer
patients organized is still ad hoc and rare. It requires, at a
minimum, sufficient material resources and physical ability for
extended engagement, in addition to a shared sense of urgency. And
although both groups made efforts to encourage more democratic
levels of participation among their constituencies, the socioeconomic
status of the most active participants was middle class or higher, a
status that was atypical of the group as a whole. 99 The same
provisos would apply to earlier women's movement activism that
insisted on more egalitarian treatment of patients by physicians and
that developed alternative or self-help health centers. 100
What Rebecca Dresser has called the "patient-centered

94. Carol S. Weisman, Breast Cancer Policymaking, in BREAST CANCER:
SOCIETY SHAPES AN EPIDEMIC, supra note 24, at 213, 220-22.
95. See WEISMAN, supra note 92, at 207-08.
96. Id.; Jane Erikson, Breast Cancer Activists Seek Voice in Research
Decisions, 269 SCIENCE 1508, 1509 (1995).
97. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 102-396,
106 Stat. 1876 (1993); WEISMAN, supra note 92, at 208; Erikson, supra note 96,
at 1508.
98. WEISMAN, supra note 92, at 208; Erikson, supra note 96, at 1508--09.
99. See DRESSER, supra note 93, at 166-67; SIPLON, supra note 79, at 5-6;
Constance A. Nathanson, A Skeptic's Guide to a Movement for Universal Health
Insurance, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL'y & L. 443, 450 (2003).
100. See WEISMAN, supra note 92, at 73.
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approach to study design and evaluation" 101 is here to stay, but it
comes with significant shortcomings.
In addition to the
unrepresentative composition of patient-advocacy groups, the
enhanced participation of disease-specific groups in medicine can
create new problems, even for advocates of greater autonomy,
equality, and participation.
For example, even the most truncated version of modern
informed consent is imperiled by advocate-driven misinformationusually excessively high expectations-about the benefits of clinical
trials. 102 The experience associated with high-dose chemotherapy
with autologous bone marrow transplants ("ABMT") illustrates the
point. Many patients initially demanded access to ABMT, with
significant success, which delayed the completion of clinical trialsthat in the end found that it was not a useful treatment. 103 Another
form of misinformation was the widespread and incorrect belief
associated with the breast cancer movement that the risk of that
disease to women's health was substantially greater than statistics
indicated. 104
The paradox for equality is that the greater the success of some
disease-advocacy organizations, the greater the likelihood that social
inequality will be exacerbated rather than mitigated because of the
skewed composition of those groups. 105 Moreover, research on
diseases that for whatever reason are not represented by active
lobbyists may be underfunded, even if they result in greater
mortality and morbidity. 106 And a simple interest-group advocacy
model is completely unequipped to address more nuanced issues of
distributive justice, such as trade-offs in resource allocation between
patients most likely to benefit versus those who are worst off. 107
Lastly, although norms favoring expanded participation would
seem the least likely to be undercut by the success of disease-specific
advocacy groups, even here the incorporation of patients into
policymaking entities is not without cost. Questions arise about the
quality and legitimacy of the patient representatives. 108
lntracommunity disputes, such as the debate among AIDS

101. DRESSER, supra note 93, at 153.
102. Id. at 58-59.
103. Id. at 61-62.
104. Weisman, supra note 94, at 236.
105. For example, Professor Renee Landers has argued that reducing
information asymmetry between patients and physicians may increase the gap
in the capacity for informed consent between patients who are best situated by
education and other skills to use the information, and patients who lack those
resources. See Renee M. Landers, Massachusetts Health Insurance Reform
Legislation: An Effective Tool for Addressing Racial and Ethnic Disparities in
Health Care?, 29 IIAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'y 1, 57 (2007).
106. See DRESSER, supra note 93, at 83-84.
107. See id. at 80-83.
108. Id. at 10--11, 35-39.
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advocates over how funds should be allocated between research and
treatment, can further jeopardize the process. 109
On balance, however, these are problems produced by the
achievements of movements that have called into question what
once was understood as a natural and inevitable characteristic of
how patients experience the health care system: as individuals
disconnected from each other and lacking any sense of group
identity. A patient-centered perspective on care must take account
of this change and incorporate the possibility of patient-group
identity, as well as individual values.

Ill. BUYING POWER
The last major component of patient identity that I will address
is that of "consumer." However distressing it is to ethicists, the
American health care system "is being actively reshaped by the
110
expectations of consumers"
and "consumer-centric financial
incentives."m I will not repeat here the catalog of differences
between the role of patient and the role of consumer. 112 Regardless
of whether medical consumerism is primarily good or bad (for
whom? for what end?), the important point about such consumerism
for purposes of this Essay is how it aligns with other aspects of the
evolution in patient self-understanding.
Medical consumerism itself is most often discussed in one of two
ways: either as a watered-down version of patient activism,
characterized by the ability of individuals to self-educate largely via
the web; 113 or as a mechanism to contain health care costs by
enticing patients into plans that shift to them more of the expenses
of treatment. 114
As to the former, David Rothman has described consumerism
enabled by the availability of information as the "second stage in the
patient autonomy movement." 115 He argues that the driving force is
109. See SIPLON, supra note 79, at 93.
110. Kenneth W. Kizer, Establishing Health Care Performance Standards in
an Era of Consumerism, 286 JAMA 1213, 1213 (2001).
111. James C. Robinson, Managed Consumerism in Health Care, 24 HEALTH
.AFF. 1478, 1479 (2005).
112. See, e.g., GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 3-5, 16-19 (3d ed.
2004); Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients?
Problems with Theory and Practice in Health Insurance Contracts, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 485, 491-95 (2004).
113. See David J. Rothman, The Origins and Consequences of Patient
Autonomy: A 25-Year Retrospective, 9 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 255, 259-60
(2001).
114. For an example, see the euphemistic description offered by Aetna.
Consumerism in Health Care, AETNA, http://www.aetna.com/aboutlaoti/aetna
_perspective/consumerism_healthcare.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2010)
("Consumerism in health care is based on the idea that individuals should have
greater control over decisions affecting their health care.").
115. Rothman, supra note 113, at 259.
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not a sense of rights, but the diffusion of technology: "[T]he balance
of power in the examining room has shifted in the 1990s not so
116
much because oflawyers, but because ofweb masters."
The latter form of consumerism is exemplified by the rhetoric
used by various industries to advertise products or by insurers
promoting "consumer-directed health care" plans that shift greater
financial risk to patients. 117 For example, a firm that offers
management consulting services declared on its website that:
In 2008, the U.S. health care system was and continues to be
in the midst of a transformational change that many believe is
centered on consumerism-the process of enabling and
engaging consumers more directly in selection and purchase
decisions regarding health care services. A traditionally oneway conversation is becoming a dialogue as the health care
system transitions from patient-oriented to consumeroriented.118
Similarly, pharmaceutical companies argue that direct-to-consumer
advertising empowers patients with information and promotes
119
"participatory health care."
The appropriation of empowerment language in such
statements-framed in terms of "decisions," "dialogue," and
"participation"-illustrates how market discourse can depoliticize
the idea of rights. At the same time, however, seeking to encourage
a consumer perspective for the patient also creates a paradox: the
effort both reduces and reinforces the idea of patient empowerment.
In many respects, the reframing of patient as consumer reinscribes a hierarchy of subordinating structures along new lines,
with patients gaining fool's gold; physicians losing power; and
greater control flowing, directly or indirectly, to payors and
marketers. Treating the patient as consumer also reflects a
commodification of the ethos underlying informed consent. On this
understanding, information and choice are simply component parts
of the service or product being provided.
On the other hand, while understanding oneself as a medical
consumer may not enhance one's actual power or capacity for selfdetermination, the rhetorical structure used to advance this idea is
consistent with norms of autonomy and participation.
This
superficial meaning accounts for the considerable popular appeal of
the consumer identity.
In sum, medical consumerism can be a quasi-bait-and-switch
116. Id. at 260.
117. See, e.g., Consumerism in Health Care, supra note 114.
118. Health
Care
Consumerism:
2008
Findings,
DELOI'ITE,
http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_US/us/Insights/centers/center-for-health
-solutions/6ca7f42c8d1fb110VgnVCM100000ba42fOOaRCRD.htm (last visited
Oct. 29, 2010).
119. Rothman, supra note 113, at 261.
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technique in which the promotion of certain products or services
highlights patient decision making, while the concomitant
heightened financial responsibility for these choices is occluded.
Lurking in the background is the serious ethical question about
whether it is ever legitimate to force individuals with serious
medical conditions to take on such responsibility.
A more defensible byproduct of the way that consumer talk is
used to backburner rights talk is that it reinforces the separate
norm of accountability. Individual accountability in the realm of
health care is a controversial principle, because it too can be
directed to the goal of cost cutting without regard to improving the
quality of care. Yet there are undeniably some contexts in which the
individual patient's assumption of responsibility for aspects of her
own health is beneficial to her, as well as to others. Accountability
has always been the flip side of the autonomy coin in moral
philosophy. 120 Increasingly, accountability is yet another dimension
that is reshaping how individuals experience the role and identity of
patient.
IV. THE FOUNDATION FOR BIOCITIZENSHIP

Citizenship has become a kind of multitasking paradigm,
invoked to signify much more than an individual's legal membership
in a sovereign state. Legal scholarship routinely uses citizenship as
a metaphor, analyzing how individuals understand themselves to be
"citizens" in relation to their families, workplaces, and ethnic
affinity groups, 121 as well as virtual citizens of more than one nationstate. 122 In its broader sociological sense, citizenship denotes roles
and identities as well as rights and obligations. It creates a subject
position not only as to nation-states, but also as to a range of much
broader systems and discourses.
Especially given this proliferation of citizenship talk, it is
notable that the intellectual history of any concept of health care
citizenship is sparse, all the more so as it applies to a nation like the
United States with largely private sector medical care. The classic
formulation of a health-related concept of citizenship is T.H.
Marshall's work. Marshall analyzed citizenship as a compound of

120. See H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., The Many Faces of Autonomy, 9
283, 286--89 (2001).
121. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil
Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 16-17 (2000). See generally Jennifer
Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA L. REV.
1161 (2008).
122. See generally Kim Barry, Home and Away: The Construction of
Citizenship in an Emigration Context, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 11 (2006); Peter J.
Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411
(1997); Alejandro Portes, Global Villagers; The Rise of Transnational
Communities, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 1996, at 77.
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rights existing in three domains: legal or civil, political, and social. 123
Marshall's legal or civil element referred to a citizen's right to
124
The political domain of
freedom from oppression, or autonomy.
citizenship spoke to a right of participation in public decision
making. 125 His concept of social citizenship referred to citizens as
beneficiaries of public goods and resources. 126 Writing in Britain
after World War II, Marshall equated health citizenship with the
entitlement to medical care, placing it in the third social domain. 127
The term "biocitizenship" is an invention of political rather than
legal theory, intended to mark the process by which individuals and
the state contest power relations as to matters of health and illness.
128
It does not refer to any form of literal citizenship.
Rather, it
connotes a relationship between the individual and the health care
system that has been more central to the interpreters of
Foucauldian concepts of biopower than to more traditional political
British political sociologist Nikolas Rose, for
philosophers. 129
example, proffers a concept of "biological citizenship" that is both
historical and contemporary. 130 Rose argues that concepts such as
race, blood lines, and eugenics have long been associated with the
framing of national citizenship, but that today new kinds of
biological citizens are forming around genetic and somatic notions of
both individuality and collectivity. 131
My focus in this Essay has been on the normative values that
lie at the heart of patient-centeredness: autonomy, equality,
participation, and accountability. These are also characteristics
that we associate with participation in a political system.
Contemporary patients, like citizens, are agentic actors, even as
123. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in CONTEMPORARY
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 291, 294 (Robert E. Goodin & Philip Pettit eds., 1997).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. ld.
127. See id. at 308-09.
128. I acknowledge that citizenship, with its intrinsic function of exclusion
as well as inclusion, is a particularly fraught concept to invoke in the realm of
health care, especially in the United States, where "universal" health-reform
legislation barred participation by illegal immigrants in health insurance
market exchanges. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.
111-148, § 1312(0(3), 124 Stat. 119, 184 (2010). Thus I allude to "citizenship"
only to point out its synchronicity with the dynamics of patient subjectivity that
also function as components of patient-centeredness.
129. "Biopower" is the term Michel Foucault used to describe indirect but
highly effective techniques of surveillance and control, through devices
necessary to the functioning of a modern state, such as health education,
population control, and the compilation of health statistics. See Bryan S.
Turner, From Gouernmentality to Risk: Some Reflections on Foucault's
Contribution to Medical Sociology, in FOUCAULT: HEALTH AND MEDICINE, at xixiv (Alan Petersen & Robin Bunton eds., 1997).
130. See NUWLAS RoSE, THE POLITICS OF LIFE ITSELF 22-27 (2007).
131. Id.
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they are simultaneously the subjects of medical or governance
practices.
Patients are increasingly engaging in decision making, the
formulation and pressing of equality demands, consideration of
resource allocation, and responding to "patriotic" calls to assume
greater responsibility for their own health. By these very activities,
they are being (re)constituted yet again, this time as virtual citizens
in a metaphorical polity of health care.
CONCLUSION

In filling out the contours of patient-centered medicine, scholars
and policy makers should begin by examining how patients have in
fact acted to reconfigure their own experience of the health care
system. As patient subjectivity has expanded to encompass the
assumption of rights and responsibilities and as norms of autonomy,
equality, participation, and accountability have become more
embedded as components of the identity of "patient," the idea of
citizen-like engagement with the health care system becomes
increasingly plausible. The move toward a model of care based on
patient-centeredness will only further strengthen this development.

